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About this book
This book explores the idea that self-knowledge comes in many varieties. We “know ourselves” through many different methods, depending on whether we attend to our propositional attitudes, our perceptions, sensations or emotions. Furthermore, sometimes what we call “self-knowledge” is not the result of any substantial cognitive achievement and the characteristic authority we grant to our psychological self-ascription is a conceptual necessity, redeemed by unravelling the structure of several interlocking concepts. This book critically assesses the main contemporary positions held on the epistemology of self-knowledge. These include robust epistemic accounts such as inner sense views and theory-theories; weak epistemic accounts such as transparency theories and rational internalism and externalism; as well as expressivist and constitutivist approaches. The author offers an innovative “pluralist” position on self-knowledge, emphasizing the complexity of the phenomenon and its resistance to any “monistic” treatment, to pose new and intriguing philosophical challenges.
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Table of contents (8 chapters)
Authors and Affiliations
About the author
Annalisa Coliva (PhD University of St Andrews, UK and Vercelli, Italy) is Full Professor in the Philosophy Department at the University of California at Irvine. She was previously Fulbright Fellow at Columbia University, US, Alexander von Humboldt Fellow at Heidelberg University, Germany, and Fellow of the Italian Academy at Columbia University. She has authored nine books, edited six, and published several articles in international journals.
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: The Varieties of Self-Knowledge
Authors: Annalisa Coliva
Series Title: Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/978-1-137-32613-3
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan London
eBook Packages: Religion and Philosophy, Philosophy and Religion (R0)
Copyright Information: The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016
Hardcover ISBN: 978-1-137-32612-6Published: 21 July 2016
eBook ISBN: 978-1-137-32613-3Published: 05 July 2016
Series ISSN: 2946-2851
Series E-ISSN: 2946-286X
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XVI, 288
Topics: Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, Emotion