Hans Vollaard is Lecturer in Dutch and European Politics at Utrecht University, the Netherlands. He has recently published on European disintegration, the Netherlands in the EU, European regulation of cross-border healthcare, and local democracy. He is the author of European Disintegration: A Search for Explanations.

All eyes are now focused on the United Kingdom's attempt to leave the European Union, but that remains an exception. No other country will want to leave the EU entirely and voluntarily. But European disintegration takes shape in a different way.

In June 2016, a majority of the British population voted by referendum in favour of leaving the EU. In the campaign, the desire to regain control over borders, laws and migration was an important motive. In particular, curtailment of migration was seen as an advantage of a Brexit.

Without full participation in the Schengen area for free travel and in the monetary union, the exit didn’t seem that complicated either. Moreover, can’t Great Britain perfectly stand on its own feet, economically and politically? After all, it still has a seat in the UN Security Council, worldwide ties with former colonies, an army with nuclear weapons and a large financial sector. In addition, the feelings of the British for the EU had never been strong. The idea that the EU is a rather undemocratic bureaucracy finally made a departure a logical way to express dissatisfaction with the EU.

However, it appears to be more difficult for the UK than expected to leave the EU. A declining pound, a lack of own laws to replace EU rules, economic uncertainty, and many more problems arise when it would leave the EU, with or without a deal. These problems will not help the desire in other EU member states to voluntarily withdraw their entire country from the union. Nevertheless, Brexit would have remained an exception even without those problems. There is no majority in any other member state in government, parliament or public opinion for a full exit from the EU.

How come? - Not because the dissatisfaction about the EU is less elsewhere than in the UK. On the contrary, in Greece the displeasure among the population is even larger. This is also not because the feelings for the EU are stronger in other member states than in the UK. On the contrary, in the Czech Republic, Cyprus, and Greece, there is much less European attachment. It is also not due to the idea that the EU takes their country’s interests into account is stronger elsewhere than in the UK. On the contrary, in Slovenia, Italy, Cyprus and Greece that idea is even less than in the UK.

The fact that there is no majority support for a full departure from the EU anywhere else is mainly due to its costs. Member states that are part of Schengen and the euro should introduce new border surveillance and a new currency. That is rather expensive. Moreover, the perspective outside the union is less attractive. However miserable Greeks may find it in the EU, a majority considers a life outside the EU even less attractive. Unlike in the UK, there is no strong belief elsewhere in the community that a country is better off outside the EU. There is no alternative international organization to provide peace and prosperity of the same quality as the EU. Additionally, many citizens, for instance in Italy, don’t think that their country has the capacity to face the political challenges of today.

Even though there would not be other instances of disintegration like Brexit, dissatisfaction may lead to other forms of disintegration. Not by countries leaving the EU entirely, but only partially. These partial exits involve member states less complying with the EU rules, for instance with respect to public finances in the Euro zone (Italy) or the Schengen rules (many member states have introduced "temporary" national border surveillance since the migration crisis of 2015).

Another partial exit is the desire to pay less money to 'Brussels', such as expressed by the so-called Hanseatic group of EU member states led by the Netherlands. Disintegration can also occur involuntarily, when one member state wants to exclude another member state. Think in this respect the calls to push Greece out of the euro or the Schengen area.

These partial forms of disintegration undermine the functioning of the EU. Its rules are less respected, and it gets fewer resources to keep on running. Thus the EU would gradually bleed to death. However, such a gradual process of dissolution also provides the EU with time to address causes of dissatisfaction, inadequate democratic influence, and limited feelings for the integration project. And the EU can do so, because there are also influential member states such as Germany in which the dissatisfaction in the EU is not so widespread, whereas attachment to the EU and a sense of democratic influence in the EU are relatively strong. Those member states therefore want to stay and make deals for their own and European interests. In this way they allow the EU to keep going.

As long as there is no good alternative outside the EU, dissatisfied member states will also continue to participate, even though it is often half-hearted. They do so, not because they love the EU, but by default. This results in the well-known image of a European Union constantly muddling through.